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1 Introduction
There have been major changes in the health care sector worldwide in contractual
arrangements between payers and providers of care. Countries with provision of
health care organized around explicit contracts, such as the U.S., moved from retro-
spective to more prospective payment systems. Preferential provider arrangements
have also been introduced. Countries with a delivery of health care based on Na-
tional Health Service, such as the U.K. and Portugal, have sought to introduce some
sort of explicit contracting.1 The definition of a contract implies the specification
of the organizations involved in the contracting process. The OECD has defined
three broad models which organize health care financing and delivery: the public
integrated system, the public contract system and the private insurance/provider
model (see, for example, Docteur and Oxley, 2003). The public integrated model,
covering countries with a national health service, such as the U.K., Spain, Italy,
Portugal, has both public financing and public provision of health care. The public
contract model involves public financing and private provision. The relationship is
organized around contracts that have evolved from reimbursement to prospective
payments, with ex-ante defined prices. Countries classified under this model in-
clude the Netherlands and Germany. Finally, the private insurance/provider model
has both private financing and private provision of care, the main examples be-
ing Switzerland and the U.S., and contractual arrangements between the insurer
and the provider are common. Even in countries with mainly public financing
and delivery of health care, introduction of competition between providers involv-
ing a more contractual approach has been attempted, for example by, Sweden,
Catalonia, New Zealand and United Kingdom. Countries under the public con-
tract model, such as Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, have also sought to
transform insurers into more active purchasers, with a role for selecting providers
and defining performance criteria. See Figueras et al. (2005) for further details
1For hospital care, the creation of DRGs- Diagnosis Related Groups- is a leading indicator for the
adoption of prospective payments. The U.S. introduced DRGs in the mid-eighties, Italy, Portugal,
Spain and Australia in the late eighties, the Netherlands in the first half of the nineties, Switzerland,
Austria, Norway and France in the second half of the 1990s, and Germany around 2003.
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and country specific information.2 Even before these reforms which introduced a
clearer role for active purchasing, the French health care system had public con-
tracts with selected private providers (clinics and hospitals) and, in the U.S., the
federal programs Medicare and Medicaid correspond to the public contract model
and the Veterans’ Affairs programs were closer to the integrated model of health
care.
Therefore, in several countries, a more explicit role is being given to active pur-
chasing of health care and selection of providers as part of the contracting process.
At the same time, there are concerns about freedom of choice and equity, as the
discussion in the U.S. shows (see below). The contracting process can be set at
the macro, intermediate or micro-level (see Figueras et al, 2005, for a typology of
purchasing levels). At the micro level, see Frech (1991) and Charatan (2000) on
the design of doctors’ fees. Also, Brooks et al. (1997) investigate how the price of
an appendectomy is set jointly by a third-party payer and a hospital.
We contribute to the discussion of the role of active purchasing by comparing
two alternative means of contracting with providers at the micro level. One is direct
negotiation between the third-party payer, and the provider. An alternative proce-
dure is for the third-party payer to follow an “any willing provider” approach: it
announces a price and a set of conditions, and any provider finding these accept-
able is allowed to join the network. The empirical relevance of this approach is
clear. In the US, “any willing provider” (AWP) laws have recently been the object
of intense debate. Such laws force managed care firms to take into their networks
of providers all those willing to accept the terms and conditions of the contract
(price, quality and licensing).
In the economics literature, there are relevant studies. Simon (1995) studies
both the characteristics of the states that have enacted AWP laws and their effect
on managed care penetration rates and provider participation. Also, Ohsfeldt et
al. (1998) explore the growth of AWP laws applicable to managed care firms and
2For example, in the period 2003/2004, there were several proposals in Germany which would
have led to more freedom for insurers to selectively contract with providers and depart from the
traditional collective contracting system.
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the determinants of their enactment. Vita (2001) provides empirical evidence that
AWP laws favor increases in health care expenditures while selective contracting
tends to reduce them. These results have not been confirmed by subsequent re-
search. Carroll and Ambrose (2002) report no impact on profitability from “any
willing provider” laws. More recently, Morrisey and Oshfeldt (2004) re-examine
the issue, including in the analysis “freedom of choice” laws (which force managed
care firms to pay a fraction of the cost even if patients use a provider of their choice
which is outside the selected network of the health plan). They look at the market
shares of health maintenance organizations in markets under different intensity of
“any willing provider” laws, finding a negative effect, though smaller in magnitude
than that of “freedom of choice” laws.
We address the question of how a third-party payer decides on the type of pro-
cedure to follow in contracting with providers. That is, we ask how does an insur-
ance company make the selection of providers to which the individuals contracting
on health care insurance access. The third-party payer faces a set of providers
from amongst whom to choose. To make the problem tractable, we consider one
third-party payer and two providers. The decision of the third-party payer con-
sists in determining the price at which to reimburse the health care services offered
to patients insured with the company. We study two different mechanisms. The
third-party payer may bargain over the reimbursement policy with each provider,
or may decide on an “any willing provider” policy. In the latter case, health plans
accept any health care provider who agrees to conform to the plan’s conditions,
terms and reimbursement rates. The questions we address are: which of these pro-
cedures should a third-party payer select and what should be the composition of
the associated set of providers?
The comparison between the bargaining protocol and the “any willing provider”
mechanism hinges upon the size of the surplus to be shared. Given that the “any
willing provider” mechanism is a commitment to be ‘tough’ (in the sense that,
once the third-party payer has announced the conditions for providers to join the
network, they cannot be modified), the larger the surplus to be shared, the more
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valuable this commitment is.
Our paper is related to Davidson (1988) and Gal-Or (1997, 1999). Davidson
looks at a model of wage determination where two firms bargain either with (i) the
unions representing their respective workers, or (ii) a single union representing all
workers. This latter scenario corresponds to our bargaining situation where the two
firms and the single union correspond to two providers and the single third-party
payer respectively. Davidson investigates the impact of the bargaining structure
on wage determination. Our interest differs in two respects. On the one hand, the
consequences of the failure of the negotiation with one firm/provider is to leave
the rival firm as a monopolist in Davidson’s model, while for us it implies that
consumers patronizing that provider must bear the full price of the health care
services provided. We seek to provide a rationale for the “any willing provider”
mechanism. Davidson’s scenario (i) represents an extension of our paper where
several (two) payers negotiate with providers. This multipayer set-up is also used
by Gal-Or (1997) to study the way in which third-party payers select providers with
whom to contract. She considers two differentiated providers and finds that when
consumers’ valuation of accessing a full set of providers is small (large) relative
to the degree of differentiation between payers, both payers choose to contract
with only one of the (two) providers. Gal-Or (1999) also addresses the related
issue of whether and how the formation of vertical coalitions between physicians
and hospital enhances their bargaining power. In another direction, Barros and
Martinez-Giralt (2005) address the issue of collusion between providers, and show
that a third-party payer may prefer to contract with an organization of providers
as this may dilute the bargaining power of more efficient providers. Glazer and
McGuire (2002) analyze the interaction between a public payer (contracting on
a “any willing provider” basis), a private one (selecting providers and adjusting
prices according to quality), and a provider. This problem is complementary to
ours, as we consider only one payer and two providers, and no quality choice. An
overview of the theoretical literature and empirical results is provided in Barros
and Martinez-Giralt (2006).
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There are other possible mechanisms of interest. One is sequential bargaining
where, after the third-party payer has finished the procedure with one provider, it
starts again with the second provider. Sequential negotiations may considerably
increase transaction costs. The implications of sequential bargaining are left for
future research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3
describes the equilibrium solution under bargaining and the equilibrium character-
ization associated with “any willing provider” contracts. Section 4 discusses the
optimal negotiation format. Section 5 concludes.
2 Modeling assumptions
A population of people each have a potential health problem. Each member of the
population has a given probability of being sick. The expected mass of consumers
demanding health care is 1 and is distributed uniformly on a [0, 1] horizontal dif-
ferentiation line. The horizontal differentiation space represents the differences
providers have in the eyes of the consumers. They can be objective, like geographic
distance, or subjective, such as personal taste for one provider over the other.3 The
location of a consumer in the horizontal differentiation space is independent of the
probability of occurrence of the illness episode. In terms of insurance choice mod-
els, this adds a background risk reinforcing the demand for insurance (Eeckhoudt
and Kimball, 1992). The population is made up of patients and is, conceivably, a
subset of all people insured. In the first-stage of the game, individuals face several
possible states of the world (for example, healthy or sick). The uncertainty faced
at this stage determines health-insurance demand. After realization of the state, if
an individual is sick, (s)he demands one unit of health care. Providers are located
at the extremes of the horizontal differentiation line. Whenever a patient cannot
patronize his(her) most preferred provider, (s)he suffers a loss in utility (or under
3Implicitly, we assume that there are no quality differences across providers. Otherwise, a ver-
tical differentiation dimension would have to be added to the problem. For quality issues in the
provision of health care in the context of vertical differentiation models see Jofre-Bonet (2000) and
the references therein.
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the geographical interpretation, has to bear a transport cost). The patients’ utility
loss increases at a constant rate t per unit of distance in the differentiation space.
As the focus of the paper lies in the mechanism by which providers are se-
lected, we abstract from the modeling of the insurance market. That is, we assume
that prices and premia are already given.4 In particular, we assume that consumers
have full health insurance (meaning that they bear no extra payment when seeking
medical care from an in-plan provider). This assumption is made for simplicity
and does not change the qualitative features of the model. This would be the case
if the insurance company offered only full insurance. The insurance contract de-
fines a premium to be paid by consumers, which is taken as given at the moment of
contracting with providers. It is also assumed that, when selecting providers, the
third-party payer has already collected the insurance premia/contributions from
consumers (for readibility, we will use interchangeably insurer and third-party
payer; the same convention applies if the government or a public health fund is
the insurer). Thus, total revenues of the third-party payer are exogenously given.
A consumer when signing the insurance contract does not know beforehand the po-
sition (s)he will have on the horizontal differentiation line when sick. This implies
that, when both providers are successful in reaching an agreement, consumers can
patronize either of them and only bear the disutility cost. In case of disagreement
with one provider, consumers have the choice of patronizing the in-plan provider
at zero cost or the out-of-plan provider at full cost. If no provider reaches an agree-
ment with the insurer, it gives back the premia to consumers and providers compete
a` la Bertrand in the market.
We restrict attention to equilibrium situations where the third-party payer con-
4We can see our analysis as part of a larger game, where first insurance is decided, then contract-
ing with providers is done and finally patients choose which doctor to see. In the case of a monopolist
(say, a National Health Service, or a regional sickness fund) there would be no specific guidance to
how contributions are set (through tax system, income related or risk related). In the alternative sit-
uation of competition, choice of the set of providers would be relevant, as well as utility of patients
in the event of absence of sickness. However. since the choice of which provider of health care
to patronize is taken after the event of sickness occurs, consumers when choosing their insurance
contract may face uncertainty regarding their future location in the differentiation space. Nonethe-
less, the problem of selecting providers is essentially the same, whatever the insurance arrangement
prevailing.
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tracts with at least one provider. The case of not contracting with any provider
means that no insurance is, in fact, given. We ignore this case in the ensuing anal-
ysis. We also assume, for simplicity, zero production costs in the provision of
health care. The qualitative results are insensitive to assuming any other symmet-
ric technology. Naturally, asymmetric technologies may produce different results.
However, those results would not be driven by the selection mechanism, which is
our object of study, but by competitive advantages stemming from the technologi-
cal differences.
Two mechanisms of price formation will be studied. A way of contracting
health care services frequently used by Governments and, to some extent, by pri-
vate health plans or insurance companies involves the payer announcing a price,
and providers deciding, on a volunteer basis, to join (or not) the agreement. This is
known as “any willing provider” (AWP) contracts.5
Alternatively, the third-party payer may negotiate with the providers. We pro-
pose the Nash Bargaining solution as the equilibrium concept. The Nash bargain-
ing solution yields outcomes that satisfy a set of four conditions (axioms). These
axioms have been interpreted as the guiding principles that an arbitrator would
follow to solve a situation of conflict.6 The solution was shown to maximize the
product of the gains of each bargainer over the fallback position.7
In our setting, the conflict appears because the insurer’s cost represents the
providers’ revenues. Naturally, the outcome of the negotiation hinges on the pa-
rameters of the bargaining problem. These are the distribution of bargaining power
among the players, and the so-called “status-quo”, or the fallback values (that is,
the outcome that would arise should the negotiation fail). Negotiations are car-
5Within this framework, providers may, or not, be allowed to balance bill patients, that is, they
may charge, or not, an amount to consumers on top of the price received from the third-party payer.
Balance billing has received some attention in the literature. See Glazer and McGuire (1993), Zuck-
erman and Holahan (1991) and Hixson (1991). Since balance billing in not crucial to our arguments,
we assume it away. This assumption is also justified by the prohibition of balance billing in several
countries.
6The axioms are: invariance to equivalent utility representations, symmetry, independence of
irrelevant alternatives and Pareto efficiency. See Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, pp. 11-13).
7An overview of the use of bargaining in health care models can be found in Barros and Martinez-
Giralt (2006).
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ried out simultaneously with the two providers who decide their actions in a non-
cooperative way. We assume that providers do not collude. The issue of collu-
sion among providers is tackled in a companion paper Barros and Martinez-Giralt
(2005).
There is a difference with existing literature that is worth noting. Fallback
values in one negotiation in our setting, depend on the outcome of the other ne-
gotiation. This happens because providers, after each negotiation, compete in the
market. Thus, the outcome of each negotiation is conditional on the expected price
of the other provider. We force expectations to hold in equilibrium.
A detailed analysis of all these elements is beyond the scope of the present pa-
per. Extensive expositions of bargaining theory are Binmore et al. (1992), Osborne
and Rubinstein (1990) or Roth (1985). Also, a short introduction is provided by
Sutton (1986).
Generically, providers may have different bargaining powers, so that the dis-
tribution of bargaining power will involve a parameter constellation for the third-
party payer and the two providers respectively. However, we are interested in com-
paring different systems of negotiation between a third-party payer and a set of
providers. To keep focus in this issue, we will assume that all providers have the
same bargaining power, so that they will be symmetric in all respects. We could
think of asymmetries in bargaining power as a way to capture differences in tech-
nology, size, quality, etc. between providers. In turn, this would imply that we
would have to allow providers to react to the differential characteristic (e.g. invest
in size, R& D, quality, etc.) introducing an additional stage in the game. In our
perception, this implied modeling would add little to the determination of prices.
We discuss the implications of this assumption at the end of the paper.
3 Equilibrium analysis
3.1 “Any willing provider” contracts
“Any willing provider” (AWP) contracts have the third-party payer announcing
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a price p, and leaving to the providers the option of joining, or not, the agreement.
Although in reality AWP contracts also include conditions on dimensions other
than price, here we concentrate on the price aspect to be able to compare the out-
come of AWP contracts with the corresponding outcome of the negotiation proce-
dure. In a world of two providers, the set of possible decisions defines four differ-
ent sub-games in prices, which in turn define previous-stage profits for providers.
Therefore, we first characterize the four subgames.8 When both providers choose
to join the agreement, demand is split in half. Each provider receives price p.
Profits earned are Πi = p/2, i = A,B. The third-party payer, in turn, obtains
profits R − p, where R denotes its revenues coming from the premia collected
from the insured individuals (exogenous at this stage). In the other polar case of
both providers choosing not to join the agreement, the market game is back to the
Hotelling price game. In this case, the third-party payer obtains zero profits as no
insurance is contracted. Providers’ equilibrium profits are Πi = t/2, i = A,B.
The two last possible cases has one provider joining the agreement and accept-
ing p, while the other stays out and sets freely its price. Without loss of generality,
we assume provider A joins the agreement. Demand is defined by the location of
the indifferent consumer, which is given by (see appendix):
tx = pB + t(1− x), or x = 12 +
pB
2t
.
Since providers are not allowed to balance bill patients, someone visiting pro-
viderA pays nothing while if he visits providerB he pays the full price charged by
the latter provider. The equilibrium price of provider B is pB = t/2 and profits are
ΠB = t/8 and ΠA = 3p/4. Third-party payer profits, Π̂, are given by the premia
collected R net of the reimbursement to provider A and of a penalty F associated
to the reduced choice of providers offered to the insurees.
The payoff matrix of the first-stage of the subgame is now given by Table 1:
[table 1 here]
8See the details in the appendix
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For the outcome of both providers joining to be an equilibrium, it is necessary
and sufficient that
p
2
≥ t
8
or
p
t
≥ 1
4
.
On the other hand, for both providers to stay out of the agreement, we need
to have p/t < 2/3. It is straightforward to check that there is no asymmetric
equilibrium in pure strategies. The different possibilities can be traced in the (p, t)
space as shown in Figure 1. Although this may appear natural given the symmetry
of players, a` priori one could not rule out that asymmetric equilibria may result
from an ex-ante symmetric market structure.9
[Figure 1 about here ]
We find that there is a range of parameter values for which both equilibria may
arise. We use Pareto dominance (from the providers’ viewpoint) as selection cri-
terion, which ensures that only one equilibrium is selected. Thus, the equilibrium
where both providers join the agreement occurs for p/t ≥ 2/3 as, in the interme-
diate range, it is dominated by the other equilibrium candidate.
We consider now the problem of the third-party payer. This is the optimal
choice of the price to minimize total health expenditure. Given the initial assump-
tion of full insurance, all expenses will be paid, irrespective of the in-plan provider
chosen by each particular consumer. The optimal value of p to be announced in the
“any willing provider” contract is the lowest price that still allows both providers
to accept. Thus, the optimal price is p/t = 2/3. This optimal price is also lower
than t, which guarantees that the third-party payer prefers to announce “any willing
provider” contracts instead of allowing free competition between the parties (and
having to reimburse consumers for the care they would receive in a pure private
market equilibrium).
9Most textbooks of game theory provide examples of 2 × 2 games of symmetric agents where
only asymmetric equilibria exist. More structured market situations, like vertical differentiation, also
result in asymmetric equilibria with ex-ante identical firms.
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Note that the payer needs to announce a fee sufficiently high to induce partic-
ipation of at least one provider. But in the equilibrium with both providers par-
ticipating the fee is higher than it would have been with an offer where the payer
extracted all the surplus (a so-called take-it or leave-it offer). In other words, the
payer is willing to give away some monopoly (bargaining) power in order to induce
an equilibrium with the participation of the providers. Thus, the (full) bargaining
power that a too rigid payer would use in committing to a low fee is somewhat
softened.
One could think of alternative ways to model fee schedules, such as a two-part
tariff where the variable part could be linked to the demand of the provider. As we
are only dealing with price schemes, appealing to real market situations, this type
of scheme is beyond the scope of this paper. Alternatively, the payer could propose
a price scheme conditional on the number of participants. In particular, a price,
p =
{
2t/3 if one provider participates
t/4 if two providers participate
would yield a unique equilibrium p = t/4 with both providers joining the agree-
ment. However, AWP regulation does not allow for discrimination among partici-
pants. Also, in our setting of perfect information, the equilibrium price should be
renegotiation-proof, so fees are not to be expected to be adjusted once providers
have agreed to the price. Table 2 summarizes the results.
[table 2 here]
3.2 Bargaining
By bargaining we refer to the situation where the third-party payer carries on
negotiations simultaneously but independently with the providers.10 The third-
party payer has a bargaining power strength parameter given by δ and each provider
is endowed with 1 − δ. Note that this situation does not correspond to a process
10The assumption of one third-party player negotiating “blindly” with two different possible
providers is not realistic. Part of the bargaining power of the third-party payer resides in the fact
that the level of toughness shown to each individual provider may be affected with how negotiations
with the other provider are going. If the providers are symmetric, this is less important.
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where after failing to close a deal with one provider, the third-party payer addresses
the second one. In our scenario, the provider when accepting or rejecting a deal
does not know the outcome of the other parallel negotiation process.
Three scenarios may appear. Both providers successfully close the negotiation
with the third-party payer, none do, or only one is successful. We start by introduc-
ing some notation. Parameter R denotes again the (exogenous) premia collected
by the third-party payer. Parameter F denotes the penalty to the third-party payer
when one provider does not accept. This penalty is left unspecified at this stage. It
captures the point that an insurer giving access to a smaller set of options in health
care provision faces a cost (for example reputation, value of variety and freedom
of choice to consumers, or money returned to insured people). By Π̂ we denote
the third-party payer’s surplus; Πi are profits to provider i when both negotiations
are successful; Π˜i are profits to provider i when its negotiation succeeds while j’s
does not, Πi are profits to provider i when its negotiation fails while j’s is suc-
cessful. Finally, Πi are profits to provider i when both negotiations fail. Table 3
summarizes these alternatives.
[table 3 here]
Given that we are assuming away production costs in the provision of health
care services, providers’ profits are simply the revenues from providing treatment
to those patients patronizing the respective facilities.
Surplus obtained by the third-party payer when negotiations are successful with
both providers are given by R − ΠA − ΠB . When, say, only provider A reaches
an agreement, the revenues to the third-party payer are R− Π˜A−F . Finally, if no
negotiation succeeds, the third-party payer obtains zero revenues (as no insurance
is contracted). We now characterize providers’ profits.
No successful negotiation
In this case the market game is just a Hotelling price game with fixed locations.
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The symmetry of the solution implies equal demand to each provider and prices
are, in equilibrium, pi = t, i = A,B. Associated equilibrium profits are Πi =
t/2, i = A,B.
We use the Nash bargaining solution as equilibrium concept. In our set up,
as two negotiation processes are carried out simultaneously, the computation of
expectations of the rival’s behavior is more involved. In the standard Nash equilib-
rium approach, the expectation is that the rival’s equilibrium price is held constant.
However in our framework, since the outcome of the other negotiation depends also
on decisions taken by the third-party payer, we require, that expectations in equi-
librium be correct. If say, negotiation between the third-party payer and provider
A fails, the third-party payer anticipates that its negotiation with provider B will
result in a different price. That is, we assume that both parties, provider B and
the third-party payer are aware that the negotiation with provider A failed. In other
words, we are imposing rational expectations in the sense that price expectations of
the parties involved in one negotiation about the outcome of the other negotiation
must be equal to the equilibrium outcome. Our approach is in line with the analysis
of parallel bargaining of Chae and Heidhues (1999, 2004).
Next, we characterize providers’ profits.
One successful negotiation only
First, take the case of only one provider accepting the price determined in the
negotiation process.
Assume that provider i accepts the deal while provider j rejects it. The negoti-
ation process between the third-party payer and provider i is described by,
max
pi
(R− Π˜i − F )δ(Π˜i −Πi)1−δ.
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The solution of this problem is given by,
pi =
4
3
(δt
2
+ (1− δ)(R− F )
)
; pj =
t
2
;
Π˜i =
δt
2
+ (1− δ)(R− F ); Πj = t8; and,
Π̂ =δ
(
R− F − t
2
)
.
The pair (pi, pj) will constitute an equilibrium price pair if (i) providers’ prices
and third-party revenues are non-negative and (ii) provider i does not want to quit
the agreement (i.e. Π˜i ≥ Πi) and provider j does not want to join it (i.e. Πj ≥ Πj).
Third-party revenues are non-negative iff R− F ≥ t/2. This condition is also
sufficient to ensure that pi ≥ 0 and that provider i does not have incentives to leave
the agreement. Provider j does not want to join iff R ≤ t/4.
Note that the latter condition is not compatible with the former, so that we
cannot have an equilibrium with only one provider successfully terminating the
negotiation with the third-party payer.
Two successful negotiations
We deal now with the conditions that must be satisfied if both negotiations are
successful.
Given our assumption of full insurance and the symmetry between providers,
an equilibrium with both providers accepting exists when the same price prevails
for both. Hence, providers will share the market evenly and their profits will be
given by half of the symmetric equilibrium price since total demand is normalized
to the unit, Πi = pi/2.
The negotiation with provider i is described by the following problem,
max
pi
[
(R−Πi −Πj)− (R− F − Π˜j)
]δ
(Πi −Πi)(1−δ),
where pi denotes the fee for provider i. Note that although R cancels from the
Nash maximand, the solution still depends onR becauseR determines the solution
when there is only one successful negotiation which is the disagreement point for
the bargain with two successful negotiations. And R affects the outcome when
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there is one successful bargain because it does not form part of the payoff when
there is no bargain at all.
The fallback level of the third party payer is defined by the profits it obtains
under the agreement with the other provider, net of the penalty associated to a
smaller set of providers than the maximum possible, R− F − Π˜j .
The fallback for provider i is given by the profits available when the rival
provider succeeds in its negotiation, Πi. This are the profits when provider i is out-
of-plan, so that those patients patronizing it have to bear the full price of treatment,
while its rival is an in-plan provider. This implies that the location of the consumer
indifferent between either provider is given by x(pi) = 12 − pi2t and provider i’s
profits are given by Πi(pi) = pix(pi). Thus, the maximizing price is pi = t2 , and
profits Πi = t8 .
We have now to define the profit value Π˜i, which are the profits to provider
i when its negotiation succeeds, while provider’s j negotiation does not succeed.
This corresponds to equilibrium values of the previous case.
The first-order conditions of the maximization problems yield,
pi = 2(1− δ)(F + Π˜− 12pj) +
δt
4
, i, j = A,B; i 6= j.
Solving the first-order conditions and denoting the fallback value of the third-
party payer as R˜ ≡ F + Π˜, that is, the net payment by the third-party payer when
negotiations fail with one provider,11 we obtain the (symmetric) prices:
pa =
2(1− δ)
2− δ R˜+
δt
4(2− δ) > 0.
Substituting the expression for R˜,
R˜ ≡ F + Π˜ = F + δ t
2
+ (1− δ)(R− F )
we obtain,
pa =
2(1− δ)
2− δ
[
δt
2
+ (1− δ)R+ δF
]
+
δt
4(2− δ)
11The penalty F for not having one provider plus the payment to the remaining provider.
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These (positive) prices are equilibrium prices if two additional consistency con-
ditions are met: (i) no provider wants to leave the agreement and (ii) the third-party
payer obtains non-negative revenues. Condition (i) requires Π(pa) = pa/2 ≥ Πi =
t/8. This is satisfied iff R˜ > t/4. Condition (ii) is fulfilled iff R ≥ pa.
Table 4 summarizes the results where, as in table 2, the first element in each
box refers to provider A, the second to provider B, and in the case of profits, the
third item corresponds to the third-party payer profits.
[table 4 here]
We can summarize the discussion in the following way: It is not possible to
find an equilibrium configuration where only one provider reaches an agreement
with the third-party payer. Moreover, when R˜ ≥ t/4 and R ≥ pa, both negotiation
processes are successful and the equilibrium price is given by pa =
2(1− δ)
2− δ R˜ +
δt
4(2− δ) .
This result implies that under an explicit bargaining procedure with identical
providers it cannot be the case that only one negotiation is successful. Again, in our
framework, the symmetry of players does result in a symmetric equilibrium. The
disadvantage, in terms of demand, from being left out is greater than the advantage
of being a price-setter. Moreover, it is not clear that the equilibrium price is smaller
than the one prevailing in the stand-alone market (that is, without insurance to
consumers). The condition for a higher price under bargaining relative to the stand-
alone case is R˜ ≥ t/2, which is compatible with the conditions for existence of a
bargaining equilibrium.
It is also a straightforward matter to see that an increase in the bargaining power
of the third-party payer (measured by a higher δ) means a lower price, as one
intuitively expects. Algebrically, this property is given by
∂p̂
∂δ
= −2(R˜− t/4)
(2− δ)2 < 0
which follows from the assumptions underlying the result above.
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4 The preferred negotiation format
So far we have presented two different approaches to the insurer’s problem of se-
lecting providers. In order to have some basis for comparison, we have reduced
the analysis to pricing decisions assuming away all other elements that enter both
in the negotiations and in the “folder of conditions” of the AWP approach. Such
elements include quality standards, time schedules, working conditions, etc. By
reducing the analysis to the characterization of equilibrium prices, we are able to
compare profits of the different agents in the different scenarios.
Note that the comparison between bargaining and AWP is only relevant for
p ≥ 2t/3 and also for R ≥ min{ t2 + F, 2t3 }. As shown previously, values of
R above t2 + F ensure non-negative profits to the payer under bargaining and
also guarantee participation by the providers; values of R under 2t/3 would yield
negative surplus to the payer under the AWP regime.
From the point of view of the third-party payer,12 the bargaining procedure is
better than “any willing provider” if
Π̂SB − Π̂AWP = p−
( δt
4(2− δ) + R˜
2(1− δ)
2− δ
)
> 0.
This condition defines a line, as shown in Figure 2, which allows for a simple
description of the basic economic intuition. The intuition runs as follows. If R˜
is small, there is not much surplus to bargain for. Hence, prices will be below
the price required in the “any willing provider” case to generate the acceptance
outcome. The reverse occurs for high R˜. Since the bargaining process transfers
surplus, the “any willing provider” contract is equivalent to a “tough” bargaining
position. The commitment to a price is more valuable when R˜ is large.
[Figure 2 about here – ]
12An alternative approach could be to take the providers’ viewpoint. More generally, we could en-
visage an additional previous stage where providers and the third-party payer decide the negotiation
format. Given that providers’ revenues equal third-party payer expenses, this yields a battle-of-the-
sexes type of situation. Typically, these games have multiplicity of equilibria. In this framework, our
approach boils down to using the third-party payer viewpoint as an equilibrium selection mechanism.
We find this more reasonable than the alternative approach because under AWP the third-party payer
is the agent taking that makes the commitment.
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Another property, resulting directly from the bargaining equilibrium, is that an
increase in the bargaining power of the third-party payer leads to a larger region
of dominance of bargaining as the preferred procedure. This follows immediately
from the price of the bargaining equilibrium being negatively associated with third-
party payer’s bargaining power.
A comment is in order here. We have seen that under bargaining given the
symmetry of the model both providers accept the same price. Why is it the case
that under AWP announcing that price is not an equilibrium? Actually, under AWP
we found that for any p ≥ t/4 both providers join. Also, we have shown that
there are two equilibria: where both providers join and where no provider joins.
Artificially, (since the Pareto criterion does not select among the two equilibria)
we are forcing p > 2t/3 to eliminate the equilibrium where no provider joins as
it cannot be an equilibrium of the full three-stage game. In other words, we are
imposing a conservative behavior on the third-party payer in the sense that we are
not allowing it to announce a price p ∈ (t/4, 2t/3) so that no provider would
decide to accept.
In our two-provider world, it is never the case that one provider decides to join
negotiations with the third-party payer, while the other provider remains outside
any agreement. One may question whether this result is robust to the number of
providers. We consider a natural extension of our two-provider model: assume that
there are n providers in the market, each pair of providers is connected by a segment
of length one of consumers. This means that now total market size is n(n− 1)/2,
and every provider competes with every other one. We are able to show that in
equilibrium, there is no subset of providers which chooses to remain independent.
By independent we mean providers that do not negotiate prices with the third-party
payer. The intuition behind this outcome goes as follows: an increase in the total
number of providers makes it less likely that any willing provider contracts will
dominate. This is so because the equilibrium price under bargaining will be lower
the higher the number of providers, while the optimal price under the any willing
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provider procedure is insensitive to the number of providers13.
5 Final remarks
In this paper, we address a simple question: what negotiation procedure should a
third-party payer select when contracting with health care providers? Two com-
monly observed alternatives have been considered: bargaining and “any willing
provider” contracts.
The main finding of the analysis is that whenever the surplus to be shared
in the bargaining is relatively high, the third-party payer prefers the “any willing
provider” system. This is so because the simple price announcement constitutes an
implicit commitment to be tough. This commitment is more valuable in the case
of a bigger surplus.
Our analysis shows that finding voluntary use of “any willing provider” clauses
in some circumstances but not in others is consistent with economic theory when a
bargaining alternative is available. This can also be related to the mandatory use of
“AWP” laws in some US states, while firms/managed care/ health plans may use it
in other states, or opt for bargaining procedures.
Although most of the analysis has been done considering two providers only,
we can extend the same arguments to an arbitrary number of providers. Moreover,
under the symmetry assumptions used, the possible equilibria with an arbitrary
number of providers are characterized by either all providers joining the agreement
with the third-party payer, or none accepting its proposal.
Some caveats to the model deserve discussion.
First, the model assumes a profit maximising third party payer so that the ef-
fect of the method of selecting the providers on the utility of patients is ignored.
Even though all patients always consume care under the various solutions, they are
affected. Some will pay a positive price for care when choosing a provider outside
the plan and some will chose different providers under different solutions.
13An appendix available at http://ppbarros.fe.unl/papers.html, shows that there is no subset of
providers which choose, in equilibrium, not to negotiate prices with the third-party payer.
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Second, the model does not tackle the issue of the insurance market. Instead we
take the perspective of a third-party payer that, at the beginning of its activity, has
a set of providers to choose among. We focus the attention in how this third-party
payer determines the price at which to reimburse the health care services offered
to patients insured with the company.
Third, we assume symmetry across providers. We conjecture that introducing
asymmetries across providers, be it in the bargaining power vis-a-vis the third-
party payer, or in the production costs of health care services, will not change
the qualitative results, especially if price discrimination by the third-party payer
across providers is not feasible. This seems to be, in general, the case. Payments
to providers can differ according to patient characteristics but not according to
providers’ efficiency level. Of course, some exceptions exist (for example, high
reputation doctors may be able to obtain a better value for consultation). We con-
jecture that the introduction of asymmetries would allow us to obtain equilibria
characterized by some providers being associated with the third-party payer, while
others remain independent. Once again, we believe the relative advantages and
costs of the different bargaining procedures to still be present.
The last issue is quality. We have assumed away quality considerations. Thus,
our analysis applies to the provision of services where quality can be easily moni-
tored, or does not have a major impact on patients’ selection of provider. Again, we
conjecture that the essential trade-off in choosing between “any willing provider”
contracts or an explicit bargaining procedure would remain. It would not change
our insight related to the incentives of the third-party payer to choose one of the
bargaining procedures proposed. This is left for future research.
The analysis leads to some testable predictions. The simplest one is that, when-
ever a high surplus to be shared exists, one should more frequently observe “any
willing provider” contracts. Another one is that the number of providers should
not have an impact on the selection of the bargaining procedure as long as the sur-
plus per patient treated is kept constant. If the per capita surplus grows (decreases)
with the number of providers in the market, then one should observe “any will-
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ing provider” more (less) often. These predictions have not been addressed in the
empirical literature.14 It is beyond the scope of the paper to empirically test these
implications. The empirical testing of the model is left for future research.
14It should be pointed out that testing the implications of our simplified model with data coming
from a world full of asymmetries in many dimensions and multiple players may be very involved.
22
Acknowledgements
We thank for comments and suggestions Gary Biglaiser, Paul Heidues, Clara Pon-
sati, Tommaso Valetti and two anonymous referees. Financial support of Fun-
dacio´n BBVA, the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA and projects 2005SGR-
00836, SEJ2006-00538-ECON, and Consolider-Ingenio 2010 (Xavier Martinez-
Giralt) and POCTI/EGE/58934/2004 (Pedro Pita Barros) is gratefully acknowl-
edged. The usual disclaimer applies.
Appendix: computation of AWP equilibrium profits
(i) Both A and B accept the contract.
This case means that both firms face the same price p. Accordingly, from the
consumers’ viewpoint, their decision as to what provider to patronize hinges on
minimizing the transport cost (or equivalently, the utility loss). Given the uniform
distribution of patients, this yields demands of half of the market for each provider.
As we assume away production costs, profits coincide with revenues. Therefore,
each provider obtains profits ΠA = ΠB = p/2. In turn, the third-party payer
obtains revenues equal to the premia collected net of the payments to the providers,
that is Π̂ = R− p.
(ii) Neither A nor B accept the contract.
This case corresponds to a situation without insurance. Both providers com-
pete in the market for patients. Given the uniform distribution of patients, and
given prices pA and pB , there will be one patient (and only one) indifferent be-
tween patronizing either provider. This is defined by the patient obtaining the same
utility regardless of the provider visited. In other words, as the patient x satisfying
U(x,A) = U(x,B) where,
U(x,A) = Y − pA − tx, and U(x,B) = Y − pB − t(1− x).
Therefore,
x(pA, pB) =
1
2
+
pB − pA
2t
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Profits are defined by
ΠA(pA, pB) = x(pA, pB)pA, and ΠB(pA, pB) = [1− x(pA, pB)]pB
Solving the first order condition of the respective maximization problems, we ob-
tain pA = pB = t, inducing x = 1/2 and ΠA = ΠB = t/2. Naturally the
third-party payer obtains null profits.
(iii) Provider i rejects the contract, while provider j accepts it.
In this case, those patients patronizing provider j do not pay for the treatment
as they as fully covered by the insurance. However, patients visited by provider i
bear the full cost of the treatment. Hence, utility derived by a patient x addressing
either provider is given by
U(x, i) = Y − pi − tx, and U(x, j) = Y − t(1− x).
Therefore, the indifferent consumer is given by,
x =
1
2
− pi
2t
.
As before, provider’s profits are
Πi(pi) = x(pi)pi, and Πj = [1− x(pi)]pj .
Provider i’s maximizing price, after solving for the first order condition, is pi =
t/2. Accordingly, its demand is x(t/2) = 1/4, and its profits Πi = t/8. Then,
Πj = 3pj/4. Third-party payer profits are Π̂ = R− F − 3pj/4.
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Table 1: AWP providers’ equilibrium profits.
A/B Join Not Join
Join p/2 ; p/2 3p/4 ; t/8
Not Join t/8 ; 3p/4 t/2 ; t/2
Table 2: AWP equilibrium magnitudes.
A,B in A in, B out A,B out
Prices (pA, pB) t/4, t/4 t/4, t/2 t,t
Demands (DA, DB) 1/2, 1/2 3/4, 1/4 1/2,1/2
Profits (ΠA,ΠB, Π̂) t/8,t/8,R-t/4 3t/16,t/8,R-F-3t/16 t/2,t/2, 0
Table 3: Providers’ profits alternatives.
i  j Success Fail
Success Πi,Πj Π˜i,Πj
Fail Πi, Π˜j Πi,Πj
Table 4: Bargaining equilibrium magnitudes.
A,B success A success, B fail A,B fail
Prices pa, pa 43
(
δ
t + (1− δ)(R− F )
)
, t/2 t, t
Demand 1/2, 1/2 3/4, 1/4 1/2, 1/2
Profits pa/2, pa/2, R− pa δt + (1− δ)(R− F ), t8 , δ(R− F − t2) t/2, t/2, 0
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pt
p = 2t/3
p = t/4
(J, J)
(NJ, NJ)
(J, J)    (NJ, NJ)
0
Figure 1: AWP equilibrium regimes.
p˜
R˜
2t/3
AWP dominates B
0
Figure 2: Optimal negotiation procedure.
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